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RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION,
NOT THE CONSTITUTION IN EXILE
Randy E. Barnett*
Let me begin by saying a few words about the so-called "Constitution in
exile." I have been very vocal in denying the existence of a "Constitution
in exile movement" ever since this meme reared its head in The New York
Times. Libertarians and conservatives do not talk about a "Constitution in
exile." Indeed, nobody did until Cass Sunstein and Jeffrey Rosen published
their "expos6s" of this alleged movement,1 the name for which they
appropriated from a passing reference in a speech by Doug Ginsburg.2
But, given that the title of my book is Restoring the Lost Constitution,3 it
is fair to ask, what difference there is, if any, between restoring a
"Constitution in exile" and restoring a "lost Constitution"? Of course,
depending on how these labels are defined, there does not have to be any
difference. My objection to Sunstein and Rosen's reference to a
Constitution in exile movement is to their claim that there is a desire to
return to a set of pre-1937 results and to restore constitutional law or
doctrine as it existed at some point before 1937, or 1941 (they vary on
which point they identify).
The lost Constitution that I discuss in my book is not, however, about
restoring a particular set of preexisting results or body of constitutional law
doctrines from before 1937. Some of these results and doctrines I like,
others I dislike. I also much prefer some post-1937 results and doctrines.
What Restoring the Lost Constitution is really about is restoring various
"lost clauses" that have gradually been removed from the Constitution by
misinterpretation over a very long period of time.
The Constitution we have now is redacted. Any practicing lawyer will
tell you that you cannot go into court and argue the Ninth Amendment.
You cannot go into court and argue the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center.
These remarks were made on March 24, 2006, at the Centennial Conference A New
Constitutional Order? held at Fordham University School of Law. This transcript of
Professor Bamett's remarks has been lightly edited.
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are
Wrong for America (2005); Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17,
2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
2. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
B. Kenneth Simon Lecture in Constitutional Thought at the Cato Institute (Sept. 17, 2002),
in On Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 7.
3. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty
(2004).
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Until United States v. Lopez4 you could not argue the Commerce Clause;
after Gonzales v. Raich,5 it is not clear you can argue the Commerce Clause
anymore. You cannot argue the Necessary and Proper Clause. You cannot
argue the Republican Guarantee Clause. You cannot argue the Second
Amendment outside the Fifth Circuit.
Whole sections of the Constitution are now gone. This is the lost
Constitution. It is not a set of pre-1937 results; it is a set of post-1789
provisions of the Constitution that are, for all practical purposes, dead
letters. Identifying the original meaning of these lost clauses and how their
restoration would affect the Constitution as a whole is what Restoring the
Lost Constitution is about. However it is labelled, this is a substantially
different project than the one that is characterized-mischaracterized-as
the Constitution in exile movement.
It is a great privilege to be on a panel with Sotirios Barber. Barber
contributed an important paper to the "Symposium on Interpreting the
Ninth Amendment" that I organized for the Chicago-Kent Law Review
when I was just beginning my scholarly transition to constitutional law.6 It
is a particular delight to be asked to comment on his new book, Welfare and
the Constitution,7 an important work of political constitutional theory. I
was struck when I read it by the degree to which he and I are in agreement
over some very fundamental issues. The issues on which we agree are
matters of principle, and where we disagree, it is largely on how those
principles should be applied in the real world of human social life.
Perhaps our most important area of agreement is what Barber calls "the
instrumental Constitution."8 As he states the position, "The Constitution
charters a set of institutions for pursuing a set of benefits in a manner
consistent with the principles of those institutions and a set of rights."9 The
end to which the Constitution is instrumental can be called the general
welfare. He writes, "My thesis is that the Constitution is an instrument of
the general welfare . . . ."10 And then, as he elaborates, "[t]he general
welfare promised by the Constitution must be seen as an end whose
meaning does not depend on the constitutional scheme established to
promote it."'1
Instead, the general welfare is a standard by which this or any other
Constitution should be judged: "[T]he Constitution deserves the allegiance
of its people only under certain conditions. It does not compete with
scientific or nonmoral propositions regarding how the public feels, the
4. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
6. See Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to
Crack?, 64 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 67 (1988).
7. Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare & the Constitution (2003).
8. Id. at 92-117.
9. Id. at 92 (emphasis omitted).
10. Id. at 100.
11. Id. at 98.
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causes of obedience, or the conditions under which people generally are
likely to accept constitutional authority."' 12 I agree with all of this. Or, as
he puts the matter in other words, "[t]he Constitution, by its language and
the object lesson of its founding, claims the fidelity of the population only
in terms of the benefits it facilitates.' 3
Accordingly, I also share Barber's conception of the general welfare:
"[T]he general welfare is in principle the welfare of each responsible person
in the community."' 14 In this regard, the general welfare is genuinely
general insofar as it concerns the welfare of each person. I share Barber's
rejection of so-called "welfarist" conceptions of the general welfare that
focus on the aggregate welfare of the community. As Barber puts it, "As
for the general welfare as the welfare of each, this assumption will be
opposed by social Darwinists and preference utilitarians."' 5
Further, I agree with him that welfare is an objective, not a subjective,
notion. Along with Barber, "I assume that the general welfare has objective
content about which people can err, that it embraces the well-being of every
responsible person, and that its intrinsic desirability supplies a reason to
believe that people will desire it under optimal conditions. '16
Finally, it is important to stress one additional area of our agreement. In
Barber's words,
As an end of government 'the general welfare' is not to be confused with
specific state provisions of the kind currently associated with the 'welfare
state.' The latter are at best means to the former .... Specific state
provisions enacted in good faith can also fail, of course, by bringing
unwanted consequences, like dependency.17
Put another way, one can view the Constitution instrumentally and its end
as the general welfare while disagreeing about the merits of particular
government so-called welfare policies, in particular, or the merits of
government welfare policies, in general.
These areas of agreement are extremely significant. First, the position
we share rejects a consequentialism based on a utilitarian maximization of
the aggregate welfare of the community. Instead, it is based on a genuinely
general welfare--or what used to be called the "common good"-defined
as the welfare of each responsible person or the good that all persons share
in common. Second, we both reject basing the legitimacy of the
Constitution on the consent of the governed in any literal sense. Instead,
legitimacy is based on the merits of the institutions established by the
Constitution and whether the commands of these institutions are entitled to
a prima facie duty of obedience. Third, we both reject a notion of
12. Id. at 94.
13. Id. at 154.
14. Id. at 104.
15. Id. at 104.
16. Id. at 106.
17. Id. at 96.
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legitimacy based on the degree of actual acceptance by the population.
Instead, legitimacy is based on whether the institutions established by the
Constitution ought to be accepted; and, if so, the commands of those
institutions are binding even upon those who do not consent to them.
Given the substantial degree of theoretical agreement, on what do we
disagree? First, we differ on the role that liberty rights play in the pursuit of
the general welfare. Second, we differ on the role that a written constitution
plays in protecting these liberty rights. Third, we differ on the proper
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. In the remainder of my remarks, I
will not identify or defend my stances on these three issues, which are the
subject of lengthy discussion in Restoring the Lost Constitution. Instead, I
will confine myself to explaining why I think we disagree about liberty
rights.
To begin with, I reject the whole idea of negative rights, negative liberty.
I am not a negative guy; I am a positive guy. I like liberty, so forget this
negative stuff. That was Isaiah Berlin's idea. 18 We're not bound by that.
So I am for liberty and liberty rights; liberty is a good thing, and I think
liberties are positive. (In this regard, I think I agree with Barber about his
basic conceptual opposition to so-called "negative" liberties.)
But the argument in my book, The Structure of Liberty,19 is that liberty,
as defined by the particular liberty rights I defend there, is essential to
solving three pervasive categories of social problems that every society
must solve somehow. These are problems of knowledge, problems of
interest, and problems of power. In that book, I explain how these
particular liberty rights are essential to solving the three categories of social
problems. Everybody, every human being, has a stake in their solution. If
it is correct that these rights are the solutions to those social problems, then
everybody has a stake in these particular liberty rights.
But some may then ask: Can we better serve the general welfare by
qualifying or supplementing these rights in some way, perhaps by
recognizing welfare rights in addition to liberty rights? My argument
against the kind of welfare rights or welfare policies that Barber would
favor is that, for a variety of reasons related to the imperative for why these
liberty rights are so essential to the common good, trying to pursue these
other welfare policies by means that themselves violate liberty rights is
likely to be counterproductive. In other words, qualifying or supplementing
these rights is not likely to achieve the general welfare, is not likely to
contribute to the general welfare, and is likely to inhibit or retard the
general welfare.
I reject the distinction Barber makes between negative constitutionalism
and affirmative constitutionalism, because I think, in some sense, it distorts
the terms of the debate. As he defines it, I too would reject the "negative
constitutionalism" that Barber rejects. Was DeShaney v. Winnebago
18. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118 (1969).
19. Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (1998).
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County2° wrongly decided as Barber argues in his book?2 1 In a Lockean
approach to the Constitution and constitutional legitimacy, the first duty of
government is the protection of rights. According to Locke, the protection
of rights is what justifies the existence of government. In the state of
nature, we all protect our own rights. Locke's argument for any
government at all is that the state of nature is inconvenient because there are
practical problems with people protecting their own rights. What we all
need is an independent tribunal of justice, an independent magistrate, who
will protect our rights on our behalf (and subject to our control). And so we
do not surrender to the state all our natural rights-all the natural rights are
still retained by the people. We surrender to the state the executive power
to protect our rights. According to this argument, the state has an
affirmative duty to protect rights. It is a positive duty and it is the first duty
of government. The performance of this duty is the only reason its
existence might be justified.
We then arrive at the next question, which Larry Sager posed: Is it a
judicially enforceable right or is it a politically enforceable right?22 That is
something about which I really do not have a firm opinion. I think it could
easily be a legitimately constitutional right that is not judicially enforceable.
But if it is not, it is only because it would be very difficult for courts to
enforce such a duty, given the fact that the protection of the laws, which I
affirm is the first duty of government, is a huge judgment call when it
comes to the allocation of resources.
As a former criminal prosecutor, I can tell you that it is very difficult to
prosecute everybody, and it is very difficult to catch everybody. Would we
then, as a practical matter, hold the taxpayers responsible for paying
monetary damages when their agents in government fail to enforce laws
adequately? Regardless of how this question is answered, I certainly think
it is a positive duty of government to protect our rights, and that many
rights that are in the Constitution are "positive" in nature.
For these reasons, I reject "negative constitutionalism" as Barber
characterizes it, even while affirming that the only unenumerated rights that
courts are authorized to protect under the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are liberty
rights. Explaining how we disagree about the role to be played by a written
constitution in the protection of liberty rights and why a written constitution
should be interpreted according to its original meaning must be left for
another day.
20. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
21. Barber, supra note 7, at 14 ("I regard the chief justice's argument for the Court's
action in DeShaney... a constitutional and strategic mistake .... ").
22. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional
Practice 84-128 (2004).
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